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A human(e) “uni-versity”: resisting scientism, technicism, and 
economism  
This article focuses on the issue of dehumanising knowledge-
generating procedures in the contemporary university. For this 
purpose different practical examples are analysed. It is argued 
that these dehumanising practices are rooted in present-day 
techno-scientistic elitism that has gone beyond the distinction 
between good and evil, and has developed into capitalistic 
pragmatism. Furthermore it is argued that these practices 
suppress critical reflection and creative alternatives in favour of 
gainful advantage within paradigmatic limitations. Real post-
modern relativism thus does not exist; it is rather the absolutism 
of the economy and the market that determine the nature of 
knowledge-building processes.  
Opsomming 
’n Mensgevoelige “uni-versititeit”: weerstand teen sciëntisme, 
tegnisisme en ekonomisme 
Hierdie artikel fokus op die vraagstuk van die ontmensliking van 
kennisontwikkelingsprosedures binne die hedendaagse 
universiteit. Vir hierdie doel word verskillende praktiese voor-
beelde geanaliseer. Daar word aangevoer dat dié ontmensliking 
gewortel is in die hedendaagse tegnosciëntistiese elitisme, wat 
die onderskeiding tussen goed en kwaad transendeer en 
agterlaat en derhalwe ontwikkel het in ’n kapitalistiese 
pragmatisme. Daar word aangevoer dat hierdie praktyke 
kritiese nadenke en kreatiewe alternatiewe onderdruk ten 
gunste van winsgewende voordeel binne paradigmatiese 
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grense. ’n Werklike postmoderne relatiwisme bestaan dus nie; 
dit is eerder die absolutisme van die ekonomie en die mark wat 
die aard van kennisgenererende prosesse bepaal.  
1. Relativism or self-interested materialism? 
Right at the outset the following questions can be asked: Are we 
really living and working in a context of postmodern relativism? Or is 
it possible that postmodern “relativism” itself has become a handy 
shield for so many absolutes, usually characterised as “isms”? In 
this regard see Latouche’s characterisation of this phenomemon: 
The economy is the religion of our time. This is attested to by 
many analyses and recognised by certain economists 
themselves. Contemporary society – and many people have 
noted it – has not chased away idols, myths and dogmas; it has 
only succeeded in replacing them with others. There is in effect 
an abundance of such candidates for the divinity: Reason, 
Progress, Science, Technology – to name only the most 
credible. In any case the devotion to Progress, the dogma of 
Development, the cult of Technology, the appreciation as if 
sacred of Material Well-Being, up to the sacrosanct Human 
Rights and the untouchable Democracy, are at bottom directly 
or indirectly linked to the economy via utilitarianism. The 
calculus of pleasures and pains, of duties and rights, of costs 
and benefits, inhabits our projective imagination and nibbles 
away at the major part of our practices (Latouche, 1995:10; 
translation – JJV). 
Over centuries we have grown into a materialistic culture of 
technical mastery for the sake of human advantage. If I understand 
Latouche correctly, this process has assumed the features of a 
religion, or rather an ideology that manipulates us into an under-
standing of rationality, such that our lives and environment are 
reduced to price and profit.  
In the Western tradition, and until the 19th century, the defining 
characteristic of the human being, in comparison to other creatures 
on earth, was said to be man’s “rationality”. As will be indicated in 
this article “rationality” has acquired a whole spectrum of meanings 
in coherence with context and time. Although the concept 
“rationality” has always had a connection with “logic”, its boundaries 
has never been very clear, and neither has the meaning of “logic” 
been. Thus from the time of Plato there was an issue about whether 
art can be characterised as something “rational” or as something 
“emotional”. In Modern times Kant thought of art as “instinctive”, 
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while artists like Jacques-Louis David thought of it as “rational”. 
Concerning “faith” the issue was similar – Kant identified faith with 
rational morality, while Lessing thought of it as largely emotional. 
Moral life suffered the same uncertainty: Hume and Adam Smith 
saw it as sentimental, while Kant made it part of a higher practical 
rationality. Practical life, therefore, was itself at issue: in terms of the 
belief in progress, practical life in its un-emancipated form was 
supposed to be brute and irrational, but in emancipated form to be 
highly rational. Believers in scientism, in turn, reduced practical life 
to an extension of natural scientific theory, to be engineered on the 
basis of quantitative observational science.  
However, whether faith or art, or law or morality, has been 
considered to be part of the rational or not, they have always been 
supposed to be subject to reason’s power. There never has been an 
indication that they may have something peculiar in themselves.  
Dehumanising in its different forms 
Given the fact that in some views of humanity all aspects of cultural 
life have been “logicised” (in terms of some specific kind of logic), 
and in other views they have been suppressed as being part of the 
brutal side of life, human life could be dehumanised in different 
ways:  
• It could be a scientistic dehumanising, in which all aspects of 
practical life become modelled on the basis of the objects and 
methods of mathematics, physics, and biology.  
• It could be a naturalistic dehumanising, in which the many 
aspects of human life called “irrational”, would be considered as 
“brutal”, and to be strictly controlled by “reason”. Humanism has 
not only suffered from the “rationalistic” reduction of human life, 
but also from the “naturalistic” reduction: “nature” has in fact been 
reduced to those aspects closely associated with brute animals, 
so that the humanness in the human being could no more be 
seen.  
• It could also be a rationalistic dehumanising – in this case the 
many aspects of especially human cultural life have been 
reduced to some specific kind of a priori logic, and therefore have 
been forced to follow the rules of such logic as far as possible. 
(To talk about a “rationalistic” dehumanising almost seems 
contradictory, since for more than two thousand years, Western 
“rationality” was supposed to be the distinctive characteristic of a 
human being. However, since the middle of the 19th century 
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more and more intellectuals have expressed serious doubts as to 
such a characterisation, and in fact, the “irrational” element has 
always been present, even in rationalism. The question now is: 
do we have a view of the human being which is flexible and 
nuanced enough not to let us fall in the trap of some irrationalist 
reductionism?) 
The issue addressed in this article is to explain how, in the course of 
time, both through shifts in the meaning of “rationality”, and through 
the collapse of rationality as a result of the growth of irrationalism 
since the 19th century, the intellectual enterprise in the university, 
under conditions of the industrialising of knowledge, has become 
dehumanised. This process finally poses a threat to the recognition 
of the dignity of the human being, and it denies the pluriformity of 
human life even more than rationalism did.1  
• How the intellectual enterprise in the university has become 
dehumanised 
This issue will be argued by defending a number of theses – nine in 
total: 
• A reductionist concept of rationality is progressively taking 
possession of contemporary global intellectual culture, limiting it 
to technical operation and gainful competitiveness.  
• The concept of rationality as that of having mastery and 
advantage has been fused with an egocentric pleasure-
maximising rationality. 
• Technoscientism and suprascientific intellectualism have led to 
intellectual elitism bordering on fascism. 
• The “marketable-knowledge” epistemology discourages critical 
evaluation and publicly absolutises the products of science. 
• That competition in itself guarantees quality, is not universally 
true. 
• The culture of learning (literacy) is dying out (inter alia) because 
the university has lost its sense of the calling to produce 
responsible intellectuals who take contextual issues seriously.  
                                      
1 I have discussed, analysed and argued this at length in Venter (2004). 
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• The belief in the saving grace of science and technology is 
problematic, if not dangerous. 
• The conservatism of scientists noted by Kuhn, is rooted in 
financial and power relationships, to the detriment of sustaining a 
responsible intellectual culture. 
• Outcomes Based Education promotes technicist training. 
Technoscientism, in whatever form, in alliance with economism, puts 
the humane basis of the university under serious threat.  
2. The university is the house of many “reasons” 
Proposition 1:  
 A reductionist concept of rationality – traditionally a core 
concept of the university’s way of work – is progressively 
taking possession of contemporary global intellectual culture. 
In as far as “rationality” is still considered important, its 
meaning is more and more limited to technical operation and 
gainful competitiveness. 
“Rationality” has always been at the core of the university’s 
“business”. History has produced a number of meanings for 
rationality, all of which  
• share the idea of “structured thought processes” (procedures); 
• are governed by some “values”;  
• are usually expressed in term of “aims” (or the “good”).  
The proposed procedures had as their aim the “truth” for the sake of 
the “good”. 
• The “good” has usually been aimed at the “moral” advantage of 
the whole cosmos, or at least all human beings.  
• Central to the development of the concept of “rationality” was 
Hellenistic scepticism: the term “ratio” suggests that given the 
“untrustworthiness” of sense and emotional experience, 
somewhere in the understanding an innate ability exists (be it 
concepts, ideas, processes), to jump over the chasm between 
“mind” and “external world”, and even see into “the mind of God”. 
“Ratio” was therefore a construct to give the “intellect”, or the 
“understanding” (whatever one may call the “higher” mental 
processes), the power that sceptics claimed it did not have. Once 
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this claim was made (it had its roots in Plato an Aristotle but was 
really worked out by the Stoics), it became an addiction for 
almost two thousand years – not even the Modern empiricist, 
Locke, and the empiricist-sceptic, Hume, doubted the presence of 
such a power in the mind. And yet the concept of “reason” was 
never stable – in the long run it almost became an empty sound.  
• Variations in the use of the term rational 
One can distinguish about nine variations in the use of the term 
rational:  
(1) The logical discovery of relative goodness leading us to the 
ontically absolute or ideal good – the oldest concept of 
rationality (cf. Venter, 1982:1-500; Venter, 1983). It was 
sometimes reduced to a strictly logical procedure as Hart 
(1977) indicates. Hart, however, neclets the instability in the 
meaning of “logic”, due to shifts in the meaning of “rational”. 
(2) Non-extremist (moderate) behaviour according to the logic of 
finding the midway between two extremes (Aristotle, Hume, 
Willem de Klerk, P.W. Botha; cf. Venter, 1995:132 ff.; Venter, 
1987:1 ff.) – this variation is easily used to project oneself as 
“moderate”, by choosing the right extremes.  
(3) Gainful (usually individual) behaviour, conforming to the rules 
of minimising input to acquire maximum advantage in terms of 
the logic of calculative bookkeeping (capitalism since the 
Renaissance). In this respect the efficiency relationship 
between means and ends is of prime importance (cf. Godelier, 
1972:12-17).  
(4) The social(ist) counterpart of “public reason” (la raison de 
l’état). It has its roots in Roman militarism, re-introduced into 
Modernity by the Machiavellian form of Romanism, promoted 
by Hobbes’s state totalitarianism, adopted as part of the 
monarchical thought of the Enlightenment, extensively 
theorised into a theoretical Modern absolute state in 
Rousseau’s works, and practised terroristically during the 
French Revolution. Rousseau uses organismic metaphors to 
describe the state: the sovereign is the “head”; laws and 
customs are the “brain”; commerce and industry the “mouth” 
and “stomach”; public income the “blood”; the economy as the 
“heart”, and the citizens the “body” and its “members”. The 
state itself is a moral, rational being, possessing a (general) 
will that constitutes justice. In this way he precedes Mussolini’s 
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irrationalist state mysticism, for he argues that in virtuous 
people the heroic passion of patriotism has been made 
subservient to “public reason”, and citizens are accustomed to 
viewing “individuality only in its relation to the body of the state, 
and to be aware of their own existence merely as part of the 
state” (Rousseau, 1916:252-273). Thus it is rational, by virtue 
of public reason, for the state to usurp the educational rights of 
parents, and to intervene in the economy at will.2   
(5) Well-founded (innate) common sense, following a deductive 
path analogous to geometry, in order to find truth that 
promotes the common good, by creating rigorous scientific 
insight into moral law, and mastering (mechanical) “nature” by 
techno-scientific craftsmanship based on rigorously deduced 
laws (Descartes; also Spinoza, Leibniz, William Petty, Turgot, 
the early Husserl, and others followed this line, with variations 
– cf. Venter, 1982:465 ff.; 1983; 2001:12-16; 22-32). 
(6) Logical autonomy, arising out of “nature”, yet establishing itself 
“above” “nature”, setting the criteria and laws for itself and the 
universe (Kantian and Hegelian rationalism; cf. Venter, 1999).  
(7) A logico-critical attitude towards every established idea – 
reason keeps itself moving in continual critical transcending of 
the accepted/established, working towards the foreign, and 
(mystically) towards the One (Jaspers, 1952:38 ff.; Winch, 
1970:99-100). 
(8) Actions conforming to goal-directed rules for efficiency (the 
latter in the widest sense, such as the logic of effective magical 
ritual) (cultural anthropology – Jarvie & Agassi, 1970:172; 
191). 
(9) The (Western) legal meaning, usually utilised in the context of 
the consequences of one’s actions. A “rational” person ought 
to know that firing a gun in an urban area may lead to death or 
injury of an innocent person. In this case “rationality” is 
                                      
2 The dialectical interplay between (3 and (4) was noted by Horkheimer (1978:48) 
in despair: “The terror which pushes reason is also the last means of stopping it, 
so close has truth come. If the atomized and disintegrating men of today have 
become able to live without property, without location, without time, they also 
have abandoned the ego in which all prudence and all stupidity of historical 
reason as well as its compliance with domination was sustained. The progress 
of reason that leads to its self-destruction has come to an end. There is nothing 
left but barbarism or freedom.” 
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understood in contrast to “mentally unhealthy”, “mentally 
immature”, and “mentally handicapped”, and of course it is the 
court’s problem to determine if an accused can be said to be 
“rational”, i.e. is able to oversee the consequences of his/her 
actions.  
The historical development of the meanings attached to 
rationality 
The 18th century physiocratic free marketeers (discussed in the next 
section) fused cartesian techno-scientism and competitive gainful 
behaviour into one concept. Thus egocentric technical rationality has 
over time become the dominant meaning of “rationality”, although it 
took two centuries for this specific ideological concept to finally 
dominate. This process has, however, been crossed by periods of 
“public reason”, whether in monarchical form, or in the form of 
republics, including so-called people’s republics, with their reigns of 
rationalistic or scientific terror.  
When techno-scientific rationality with its hidden “strategies” for 
taking advantage in so-called “competitive” situations becomes the 
core meaning of “rationality”, then the emancipation of humankind 
expected by the Enlightenment philosophers gets stuck halfway, or 
is seriously delayed. “Rationality” was, for the important Enlighten-
ment thinkers, the basis of peace, justice, and morality. Competition 
was the mechanism (never the end) used by “nature” to get 
humankind to that utopian “rational” situation. Not surprisingly 
therefore, the Neo-Marxists in deep pessimism saw the 
emancipation project of the Enlightenment as incomplete, even 
floundered: unreason became the rational. Although the Neo-
Marxists wrote during the era of Stalinism, Fascism, and Nazism, it 
is as if they had seen the era of global technical economy coming 
(cf. for example Horkheimer, 1978:48; Habermas, 1971, especially 
81 ff.; Marcuse, 1964:144 ff.).  
Progressively the economy became the leading factor in social life. 
The state and religious institutions are thus, in the name of 
“freedom”, bluntly told to keep their hands off the free market. 
Gradually the values of the market have become the values of 
“society”.  
The “good” according to the kind of “rationality” proposed by 
economism is the maximising of individual utilitarian self-interest (for 
the minimum input or “cost”). Self-interest is in this respect 
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understood in the terms of “popular” hedonism (i.e. indulgence 
rather than the healthy sobriety of the original hedonists).3   
When an intellectual community adopts this kind of rationality as its 
core value (whether under the name of “entrepreneurship”, 
“competitiveness”, “free enterprise”, or “excellence”), its long-
standing tradition of transferring a culture of communal intellectual 
responsibility under conditions of freedom is seriously threatened. 
The more “competitive” the educational or learning situation 
becomes, the less it becomes possible to establish a caring society, 
for the individual intellectual leader learns to focus on personal (or 
group) advantage first and foremost, and to squeeze this out of 
“nature” (and in the context of growing “naturalism”, out of fellow-
human beings).  
Practical implications of this view of rationality 
Funding for intellectual institutions has been declining proportionally 
over the past decades.4 This declining funding creates the 
appearance of a competitive situation. On the one hand this 
situation heightens expectations of good products, and on the other 
hand, it institutionalises a (manipulated) survival struggle that 
replaces collegiality with strongly egocentric behaviour (coded as 
“rational”).5 The university thus becomes just another civil utility (like 
a water or electricity supply company) in which the capital demands 
                                      
3 “Hedonism” is usually defined as searching for “pleasure” and avoiding “pain”, 
but this was traditionally not meant in the sense of partying and having orgies. 
The latter meaning is what I call “popular” hedonism after the analogy of the 
Marxist term “vulgar” materialism (i.e. materialism without a social face). 
Traditionally “hedonism” (“seeking pleasure”) referred to leading a healthy and 
sober life (pleasure), and to abstaining from emotional and public involvement, 
as well as indulgence (i.e. avoiding “pain”). 
4 Cozzens and his friends (1990) talk of a steady state model of research funding 
since the 1970s, meaning that the funding since then has remained at the same 
level (or declined somewhat), while costs and expectations have been rising. 
This decline implied that the basic disciplines had to “do more with less”. 
Especially the humanities were assumed to be able to do so much more with so 
much less (cf. Bunting, 1996). More serious, however, was the fact that poorer 
economies followed the steady state model of the richer ones, but their 
spending on intellectual culture steadied at a much lower proportion of GNP 
than the level at which the richer ones went into steady state.  
5 Over centuries a whole mythology has been constructed around 
competitiveness: it is supposed to promote (even guarantee) good quality (even 
excellence), high output, economisation on input, justice, and even moral 
integrity.  
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of competing/demanding utility suppliers (“scholarly technicians”) 
have the upper hand over the needs of the basic sciences, and 
especially the requirement of methodologically highly developed 
hermeneutic brain power needed by the humanities and philosophy. 
Thus reflexivity in teaching and research is marginalised and almost 
completely replaced with calculative technique and specialised 
product. The unifying core of universal and local traditions of the 
academe struggles for survival in isolated pockets, and the 
“multiversity” enforces its presence.6
3. “Masters” of the universe? 
The “cult” of scientific technology is the upper story of the current 
rationality building (and its remnants in contemporary irrationalism), 
with the calculative, self-interested, concept of rationality as the 
ground floor.  
Proposition 2:  
 The concept of rationality as that of having mastery and 
advantage was fused with the egocentric pleasure-maximising 
rationality in the nineteenth century. 
“Mastery” and “advantage” is already inherent in the late 
Renaissance thought of Francis Bacon (1561-1626), but comes to 
full expression when Descartes (1596-1650) finds his basis of 
certainty about the laws of mechanical nature in (a priori) calculative 
reason itself. He believes in a divine law that demands the 
promotion of the general good of mankind, reached through the 
knowledge of the elements and the powers of the universe, thus 
rendering us “lords” and “possessors” of “nature” (Descartes, 
1969:49) – lordship and possession after the image of the 
craftsman! This line of thought indeed established a fascinating 
connection: “lordship”, “possession”, “craftsmanship” – “mastery” 
and “ownership” by “technique”. 
Contemporary Western knowledge is seen as mastery, from its 
cradle, in many senses: it knows by making, it masters by making, it 
masters by owning, and by taking advantage. For Descartes this 
                                      
6 A book essentail to read by anybody who wants to understand the issue of the 
university falling into ruins (Readings, 1996) is the work of Clark Kerr, former 
president of Berkeley University: The uses of the university (1963). In all naivety 
he gives us the “non-university”, which he calls the “multiversity” – a “thing” 
without any kind of identity except maybe a “common grievance over parking”.   
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process was still aimed at the “general good”; later – as Hobbesian 
competitive naturalism increased its hold – the advantage of the 
stronger individual came to be the norm.  
The reduction of “nature” to its exploitable resources  
This concept of human power and control over “nature” was not 
limited to the abstract culture of philosophy and science. It is also 
inherent in the more popular culture expressed by Defoe in his 
fictional narrative “history” of human progress in Robinson Crusoe. 
Defoe, however, adds another factor: the “market”! And in Moll 
Flanders the Hobbesian equality of the cunning underdog female is 
expressd in a fascinating way.  
In capitalist theory, aptly expressed in the words of the physiocrat, 
Quesnay (1694-1774), natural law takes a double meaning:  
Natural laws are either physical or moral. By physical law one 
understands the regulated course of every physical event that is 
evidently the most advantageous for humankind. By moral law 
one understands the rule for every human action conforming to 
the physical order that is evidently the most advantageous for 
humankind. These laws form the ensemble of what is called 
‘natural law’ (Quesnay, 1965:374-375; translation – JJV). 
This value system which identifies physical law with advantageous 
events, and morality as conforming to the order of the physically 
advantageous, is a clear ethical rationalising of the reduction of 
“nature” to its exploitable resources. It provides the basis for the 
structuring of our knowledge-generating procedures exactly for this 
aim – a hidden epistemology! Note however: “nature” in “natural law” 
finds its basis in physical law, yet it does not exclude the human 
being. It rather looks at the human being from its “underside” (the 
subrational) to its “upperside” (the rational)..  
The growing emphasis of an instinctively competitive, human 
being 
Quesnay and his physiocratic followers are well-known for their 
insistence on market freedom. Can we afford to forget Quesnay, an 
almost forgotten 18th century economist? The parallel between the 
physical world and the mental world with regard to human 
advantage is also found in Edgeworth, a well known 19th century 
theoretical economist and follower of Bentham’s calculative 
utilitarian theory. This line of thought is repeated by the influential 
20th century monetarist economist, Friedman. And it is still with us 
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and is still used in defence of the unfettered market. (This approach 
is mirrored in the psychologist Maslow’s hierarchy of needs.) 
However, a very important aspect of the constellation of ideas about 
scholarship itself, both in the area of the natural sciences and the 
“moral” sciences, is to be found in the “giant” of the 18th century, 
Kant. Descartes still assumed the idea of an a priori law with a 
heteronomous origin, which allowed the human being technical 
mastery – but then mastery in application. Kant gave a different 
perspective: he was moving zig-zag between a naturalistic 
determinism at work in history on the one hand, and an autonomous 
imposition of the “law” on the other. Humankind is the product and 
puppet of “nature”, yet it is also the free lawgiver of the cosmos. By 
“law” he had in mind both moral law as a (rational) formula, and 
physical law as the product of human planned experimental 
technique.  
With regard to the natural sciences (constructing physical law) Kant 
(1975b:23-24) states two points very clearly:  
• even natural law is somehow a product of reason;  
• natural law is the conceptual product of technical planning and 
execution. 
Kant, however, goes further: the rational technician has a special 
place, for only to him be the overview of history (reality) and the 
destiny of humankind. The scientist can and should rise above the 
“leading strings” of nature. The ordinary, unenlightened members of 
the public are on nature’s “leading strings”, bound like planets in 
their orbits (Kant, 1975a:35). Heidegger (1938:85-87) rightly under-
stood Modernity: the omnipotent scientist sets the stage, directs the 
play, and plays the lead role. 
Soon in the 17th century after Hobbes had presented his readers 
with an instinctively selfish, competitive, human being, who would 
eliminate the opponent in order to keep the comparative advantage, 
the idea of progress through conflict gained strength. Where it did 
not take a militaristic balance-of-powers format (as in Kant’s 
philosophy of history), it rather assumed an economistic one. 
Suggestions of the overriding importance of middle-class life – as 
rational life! – are already present in Robinson Crusoe, and 
expanded to a full base-superstructure model in Turgot (anticipating 
Marx).  
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All relationships seen in terms of self-interested contractual 
exchange  
It was, however, Adam Smith who set the scene for liberal 
economism ever since. The metaphor of the self-interested 
individual concluding contracts is expanded to characterise all 
human relationships. What was meant metaphorically gradually 
assumed literal meaning:  
• Bastiat’s adage, “exchange is society” (quoted in Berthoud, 
1995:63) is becoming a practical totalitarian truth, when even 
churches show the traits of searching for financial gain and 
attempting to organise themselves according to managerial 
techniques. And the understanding of all social relationships in 
terms of self-interested contractual exchange has remained with 
us ever since.  
• The influential Austrian School of Economics stresses universal 
competitiveness (and is prepared to reduce issues of justice for 
the sake of “freedom”). This, together with the assumed parallel 
between physics and economics, remained in Neo-Classical 
theory and in Monetarism (cf. Venter, 2002a:296 ff.).  
• The Neo-Liberal paradigm has subdued the doctrine of progress 
and substituted the doctrine of unfettered economic growth for it, 
yet at its foundations the belief is still that if we can get the 
economic base right, then the socio-cultural problems will 
simultaneoulsy improve.  
The economic (material) base, however, has its own values to strive 
for, hidden in the supposed aims of an economic system. Turgot and 
Adam Smith saw the aims of the economic system as the creation of 
national wealth, but Smith defines “wealth” in terms of a hierarchy of 
enjoyments bought by the amount of labour commanded. At the 
lowest level we have the basic needs to be fulfilled, while the higher 
aims are in the area of comfort and entertainment: “Every man is 
rich or poor according to the degree in which he can afford to enjoy 
the necessaries, conveniencies, and amusements of life” (Smith, 
1950:32). 
We have to note that although Smith speaks about “every man”, 
somehow the wealth of the nation takes precedence in his mind. 
The freedom of the individual is, however, needed to create such 
national wealth. However, the freedom of the individual is locked into 
an uncritically accepted class hierarchy: implicitly for the working 
class the necessaries, for the middle class the necessaries and 
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comforts and some amusement, for the arrived nobility the 
necessaries, the comforts and lots of amusement.  
Practical outcomes of an economistic society 
In the meantime the nobility has disappeared, and the difference 
between middle class and underclass has also assumed regional 
overtones. The value system has, however, remained, and become 
skewed towards comfort and entertainment. The tendency towards 
over-consumption of both resources and luxuries, the growing 
earnings of gambling businesses, the speculative movements in the 
financial markets, and the huge salaries of sports stars, all indicate 
that our economistic society – especially from the side of the 
stronger economies on the global scene – allocates more and more 
resources in the direction of Adam Smith’s “amusements”, as well as 
the non-productive profiteering in financial markets (often to the 
detriment of weaker economies). This while the serious problems of 
poverty have not been solved even in the richer countries.  
The ideological belief that science can solve our problems by 
(re)making the world through technical standardising or 
standardised techniques, and that what is technically possible 
should be done, has always gone hand in hand with the ideal of the 
free market, the adherents of which have ever so often chastised the 
state for intervention in the market, even when issues of public 
justice were concerned.  
Propositon 3:  
 Technoscientism and suprascientific intellectualism lead to 
intellectual elitism bordering on fascism 
Von Hayek (1951) indicates with great care how the adherence to 
the scientism of the French revolutionaries helped to devour the 
French Revolution. The belief that the procedures of the natural 
sciences are the only valid methods for the acquisition of trustworthy 
knowledge was the principle of transformation for the education 
system. Education at all levels, also at tertiary level, was reduced to 
training in mathematics and science by the leaders of the initial 
revolution. Von Hayek argues that scientism is the cradle of 
totalitarian collectivism, for it tends to ignore the creativity of 
competitive individuals. The adherents of scientism, he warns, are 
the over-confident know-alls: they tend to believe that it is 
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scientifically possible to know what is good for all of society, and that 
society can be organised according to the principles of science.7
Trusting in natural science and reason in general, France was 
brainwashed by especially the thousands of Masonic lodges working 
among both the intellectuals and the poor,8 into accepting elitist 
governments. The idea that those with developed rational insights 
had to lord it over to those who were still on the way (for the sake of 
the poor and the downtrodden), was founded on three beliefs:  
• in the power of techno-scientistic rationality;  
• in the absolute authority of “public reason” (the state as the 
“rational” according to Rousseau); and  
• in the inevitability of progress.9  
                                      
7 I agree with Von Hayek that in Western thought a link exists between 
totalitarianism and the overestimation of the intellectual. George Orwell, in 
Animal Farm, attacks exactly this aspect of socialism. Not all proponents of 
intellectualism are, however, also adherents of scientism. Plato was an 
intellectualist and a totalitarian utopian, and so was Rousseau. But neither were 
adherents of scientism. Yet it is factually true that the majority of revolutionary 
philosophers, in particular Voltaire and the Encyclopaedists, were fascinated by 
the possibilities of science to create a better life. However, usually a theory of 
reality is also involved in authoritarian totalitarianism: organismic holism.  
8 The Duc d’Antin, first leader of all the French Masons, summarised Masonic 
humanism in the 1740s as follows: “Human beings are essentially distinguished 
by the difference in languages which they speak, the habits which they follow, 
the land which they occupy, or the dignities with which they clothe themselves. 
The whole world is nothing but a great republic, of which each nation is a family 
and every individual a child. It is for the sake of reviving and expanding these 
essential maxims, drawn from the nature of humankind, that our society has 
been established. We want to reunite all human beings in an enlightened spirit 
of kind morals and friendly attitudes, not only towards the fine arts but even 
more through the great principles of virtue, of science and of religion, where the 
interest of [universal] brotherhood becomes that of all humankind, where all 
nations can draw on solid knowledge, and where the subjects of all kingdoms 
can learn to mutually appreciate one another, without renouncing their 
fatherlands. … What an obligation do we not have to these superior men who, 
without vulgar interest, without even hearing the natural envy to dominate, have 
imagined an establishment of which the unique goal is the reunion of spirits and 
hearts to make them the best, and over time a totally spiritual nation, in which, 
without withdrawing from the different duties which the differences of states 
demand, one creates a new people which, being composed of different nations, 
will cement all together, in this case by the bond of virtue and of science” 
(quoted from Pope-Hennessey, 1911:22-23).  
9 Cf. Rousseau (1916:247-287); Venter (1996:184 ff.; 1996:23 ff.; Venter, 1999c).  
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Soon France had a government of dangerous know-alls, the 
(probably “occult” “enlightened”) Jacobines – the prototype of 
Stalinism. The universal brotherhood preached by the Masonics, 
with its elitist “enlightened” leadership, ended up in an ironic medal 
inscripted: Soit mon frère ou je te tu. (Be my brother or I’ll kill you.) 
The same techno-scientistic pretence prepared the French to accept 
the soldier Napoleon as saviour from the Jacobines. In his technicist 
elitism and self-righteousness, Napoleon denigrated religion, 
democracy and critical thinking, and projected himself as both a 
Caesar and a Christ. It was easy: issues of religion, history, classical 
languages, justice, rights, dignity, values and quality of life had 
already been eliminated from education, and replaced with issues of 
science and technique, by the progressivist mathematician 
Condorcet (the education planner of the Revolution). Centralised 
power was stronger after the revolution than before it, says Jacques 
Ellul (1967: xiii-xxi). 
One of the products of scientism, Auguste Comte, the father of 
positivism (who even supported the rise of Napoleon), in his mature 
years admitted that those regularities (“natural laws”) disclosed for 
the advantage of humankind, were still meaningless without some 
humane centre of gravity such as “love”. And then – in the face of 
Napoleon’s technoscientism – he recovered the religion of humanity 
from the ashes of the revolution, in order to have a meaningful 
object of love (but now giving the sentiments equal status with 
reason). 
Somehow the free-market economy proposed by the physiocrats, 
combined with the belief in progressive control of “nature” by 
science and intellect, and supported by intransparent manipulative 
methods ingrained by secret societies, had transformed itself into 
the terror of Jacobinism (first) and a military dictatorship: one 
“enlightened” human being playing god for others.  
I would suggest that this was not a temporary deviation conducted 
by some egocentric militarists. It is part and parcel of the doctrine 
that science, rationality, and/or intellectual insight is identical to 
“wisdom”, and occupies the position of “nature above nature”. Call it 
the elitism of the earliest “supernatural natural” minds (the minds of 
the learned persons – an idea defended by Kant, Hegel, Comte, 
Marx and others). This elitism is still alive – if one but reads about 
the struggle to clarify the needs and the revolutionary mission of the 
under-classes in 20th century Marxism, or the foundations of 
apartheid as “promoting” the needs of underdeveloped ethnic 
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groups, or the confusions about the rationality of non-Western 
cultures (mentioned in footnotes 6 and 7), or nowadays, the 
insistence on the free objectification of the human being by 
biotechnologists (cf. for example Bayertz, 1996).  
4. Marketable knowledge 
Firstly, when under situations of economism our knowing is aimed at 
the market, sponsored mostly by industry, the issue of intellectual 
property comes to the fore. We are faced with more and more patent 
and licensing agreements. Even graduate research outputs for the 
military (including Master’s and Ph.D. theses) are classified as 
“secret”. 
Proposition 4:  
 The “marketable-knowledge” epistemology discourages critical 
evaluation and publicly absolutises products of science. 
Understandably even educational institutions, and for sure their 
sponsors, will want to protect their investments. But knowledge and 
information acquired under intransparent circumstances and 
controlled by those who have financial interests in it are withdrawn 
from public or peer scrutiny (that already struggles to sort the corn 
from the chaff). Techniques developed under these conditions are 
practically beyond critique and reproach (and safeguarded against it 
by licensing), even if they are very problematic with regard to a 
complete and full human life. One very brief example of such a 
licensed technique in which the human being is detrimentally 
objectified is the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator, a psychometric test.  
Practical example: the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator  
The front page of this psychometric test tells us the following about 
the test: 
There are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers to these questions. Your 
answers will help to show you how you like to look at things and 
how you like to go about deciding things. Knowing your own 
preferences and learning about other people’s can help you 
understand where your special strengths are, what kinds of 
work you might enjoy and be successful doing, and how people 
with different preferences can relate to each other and be 
valuable to society. 
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When this test is used – as it is often done – to determine whether a 
person fits a constructed profile for some or other function, it is 
already used as a module: it is aimed at a self-profiling; yet it is used 
by employers to profile their employees. A “module” is typically a 
piece of abstracted-abstract technique, that, when used for a 
purpose different from the original and intended, has a bigger 
chance of missing the target. 
A person not licensed to apply this test is not allowed to have it in 
his/her possession. Requests to have it for the purpose of scholarly 
analysis have been ignored. But let me indicate the technological 
reductionism of the test. Question 9 asks: 
Would you rather be considered 
(a) a practical person, or 
(b) an ingenious person? 
It can rigthly be asked how one should respond to a question 
formulated thus. See the following reasons for asking this question: 
• It is a principle of exegesis to take context into account. The 
meaning of a word is constituted somewhere in the interaction 
between accepted intuitions and context – in this case an 
important part of the context of “practical” is “ingenious”, and vice 
versa. What are we now to assume? Since the question wants us 
to select one of the two, are we to take the logical basis of 
meaning into account in this respect, and thus infer that their 
mutual interrelationship is analogous to that of mutually exclusive 
collections? But can we truly intuitively assume that the two 
categories are mutually exclusive? Why should a very “practical” 
solution of a difficult problem not be “ingenious”? Why should I 
rather not want to be both “practical” and “ingenious”?  
• The issues about context do not exhaust the issues of meaning in 
this respect. A word like practical can only be “understood” in this 
meagre context on the basis of the historical intuition of the 
respondent. What did the authors of the test have in mind? 
Consider the following possible aims they had: 
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− Practical as in handy in a physical sense versus ingenious as 
in smart in an imaginative idea-constructing sense; or  
− practical as in easy and cheap to do; or 
− practical in the sense of giving the best possible solution, 
efficient for a long period, although expensive and complex?  
 And which of these three possibilities may not, at least 
sometimes, be characterised as ingenious?  
• Furthermore, the third option in itself points to a further difficulty – 
that of inductive logic in terms of time. The respondent is forced 
to make a generalised wish from one of two intuitively positive 
characteristics – he/she might wish to be both, for both seem to 
be positive characteristics. However, the question leaves no other 
possibility than to say: “I would rather always be considered 
‘ingenious’ (as the case may be: ‘practical’).” An impossible 
generalisation about one’s own wishes, because if the two are 
really different, should one not prefer to be considered practical in 
situations that demand being practical, and ingenious in 
situations that demand the latter?  
• More fundamentally: “opposite” meanings (especially, but not 
only in an exclusive sense) are usually determined during the 
formation of a life view tradition (over a long period). They are not 
summarily a priori opposite in a logical sense. How can the 
authors of the test assume that their intuitions of the meanings of 
the categories are the same as those of the respondents? And if 
they cannot so assume, how can they be sure that they are 
testing what they intended to test?  
• When the test is used for selection, it is interpreted against a 
profile. The employer (or management) will supply a profile which 
the person who fills the vacancy, should more or less meet. The 
test is formulated in futuristic terms: “how would you like to be 
seen?”; “‘what would you like to be?”; “under such-and-such 
circumstances what would you tend to do?”, and “how would you 
prefer to react?” This is to be expected, since it is a self-
development test. But now one is faced with oppositions such as 
the above. Other oppositions in the test are: “rational” versus 
“sympathetic”, and even “merciful” versus “just”. In the case of 
“rational” a wider context might jump into the mind of the person 
tested: “rational” versus “irrational”. In the usual or ordinary mind 
state of fairly literate people, “irrational” may mean something like 
acting in an arbitrary way, and even mentally disturbed. In the 
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legal mind acting “rationally” means something like applying your 
mind in terms of ordinary logic, in order to foresee the 
consequences of your actions, while acting in the opposite way 
might constitute a criminal offence.  
In the tradition of liberal economic theory (from Adam Smith 
onwards), “rationality” has been praised as the characteristic of 
the mature human mind, but even such praise singers (as Adam 
Smith) would argue that, at least for now, one has to follow one’s 
self-interested gut feelings, since “rationality” is too slow and 
indirect to be the basis of a successful individual and society. 
However, during the past century, the idea that “rationality” was 
the distinctive characteristic of being human, collapsed. Thus 
among managers “trusting one’s gut feeling in a context of 
uncertainty” has taken form as a method of management (Bruère, 
1987:84-102).  
If the profile would be looking for a person with a good intuition, 
or gut sensitivity, an instinct for the interests of the organisation 
above all, then I do not know which choice between a constructed 
opposition between “rationality” and “sympathy” would help the 
profiler. And since the person tested has not seen the profile (and 
has no idea what philosophy of management lies behind the 
profile), such a person may for instance avoid making him/herself 
look “irrational” (given the other meanings of “rationality”). (Yes, 
there are hundreds of other questions in the test, some of which 
may neutralise my problematic examples. But none of us know 
how the profiles are weighed. And of course, if that were known, 
the person tested could give the answers wanted, by adjusting 
his/her true wishes a little bit.) 
• Finally, let us be very graceful to the test, and suppose that it can 
give a clear indication of how the tested person would like to 
develop. Suppose further one candidate does not fit the profile 
given by the employer, and another candidate does fit the profile. 
Since there is no right or wrong answers, one is supposed to be 
honest with oneself when answering the questions. In such a 
competitive situation, a possibly better candidate for the job may 
be eliminated because he/she has not been given a good 
opportunity to decide if adjustment of one’s wishes is worthwhile 
in order to get the job. (One might idealise marrying a plump red-
haired woman, and end up falling in love with a skinny blonde. 
Very few of us are probably in the job and position we hoped for 
ten years ago.) If one takes into account that for some people 
trained in certain traditions of economic theory, “rationality” 
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means “self-interested behaviour”, while “gut feeling manage-
ment” means the same, it may mean that an applicant may be 
faulted for giving the “correct” answer but using the wrong word 
for it.   
These critical questions are suppressed because those who are 
licensed to possess the test, use it in the market and earn 
something with it. They are therefore not likely to question their own 
unique instruments, procedures, and methods. And those who are 
likely to problematise the test, are not allowed to have it in their 
possession!  
Problems of the the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator  
The problem with the test is that it ignores the “humanities” context 
of human meaning-interpreting behaviour. It explicitly assumes that 
the respondent is intuitively ready to answer the question. It remains 
very near to the reduced concept of meaning found in the 
behaviorist approach of, for example, Bloomfield – as if a word is a 
direct stimulus – rather than a context-networked expression of 
meaning – which will elicit a fairly regular (almost causally 
determined) response (cf. Venter, 1999c:180 ff.). However, since the 
test assumes machine-like stimulus-response behaviour, it reduces 
the tested person to an object producing apparently deterministic 
reactions to supposedly unequivocal stimuli. This procedure denies 
human subjectivity and dignity. 
University training devoid of a hermeneutic and value context, 
produces technicians who, with the best intentions in the world, have 
serious problems to become humane intellectual leaders. In fact, the 
lack of this context lowers the quality of even technical science, for 
absolutised technique is bad technique, since it relinquishes itself 
from the sphere of responsibility. And instead of cultivating the world 
and emancipating the human being from toil, it becomes a divinity by 
projection (to use Feuerbach’s term), with an extremely demanding 
priesthood. There is something prophetic (but ironical) in the title of 
Hazel E. Barnes’s book of 1970, The university as the new church!  
Proposition 6:  
 The belief that competition in itself guarantees quality is not 
universally true. 
Secondly, the quality of marketable academic output (excellence) is 
supposed to be determined by its “competitiveness” in the “market”. 
If “competitiveness” is our only criterion, we are in fact using an 
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empty concept of excellence (cf. Readings, 1996:24-25). This 
means almost enforcing the destructive Hobbesian “comparative 
advantage” approach to human relationships – a permanent looking 
over one’s shoulder to see how far ahead one is, with no goalpost 
this side of the grave.10 This attitude implies a severe tension, since 
we expect both competitive individual excellence and sharing in 
teamwork. Competitiveness has always been presented as a 
guarantor of quality, which it is not. Competitiveness does increase 
output, that in turn promotes standardisation. This in turn 
strengthens the grip of standardised techniques. Quality products 
may strengthen the competitiveness of an institution, but competition 
does not guarantee quality or efficiency.11 One rather finds a niche 
market in which a certain quality level is acceptable – be it high or 
low. Thus the competition code is strengthened through the 
emptiness of comparative excellence – since “quality” remains 
undefined, competition has no challenge for its position. 
The idea of competitive excellence  
In a “post-modern” relativist context, the idea of competitive 
excellence imposes itself with the severity of Hobbes democratised: 
the aims of investment (for example economic growth) justify the 
means by which one competes (for example pushing the weaker out 
of their earnings, or logging away the jungle home of the Bonobo 
chimps). In fact, the situation increasingly assumes the mask of 
Social Darwinism: eliminating the weaker is in itself fair and just, and 
winning in this way is in itself excellent and virtuous. Of course it is 
not presented in these terms: it is rather said the loser looses simply 
because he/she is not “competitive”! This is almost tautological.  
                                      
10 Hobbes rejects all final norms; in a sense he is the first “post-modernist”. 
Nothing is fixed; there is only empty, aimless competition: “… the felicity of his 
life consisteth not in the repose of a mind satisfied. For there is no finis ultimus, 
utmost aim, nor summum bonum, greatest good … Nor can a man anymore 
live, whose desires are at an end, than he, whose senses and imagination are 
at a stand. Felicity is a continual progress of the desire … because he cannot 
assure the power and the means to live well, which he hath at present, without 
the acquisition of more. … Competition of riches, honour, command, or other 
power, inclineth to contention, enmity, and war: because the way of one 
competitor, to the attaining of his desire, is to kill, subdue, supplant, or repel the 
other” (Hobbes, Leviathan, 1946:63-64). 
11  The prize winning biologist, Lynn Margulis, says “I am worried about the erosion 
of classical knowledge. People have to make news to get their grants” 
(Margulis, 2003:2).   
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Yet humans are not simply Darwinist wild dogs who act by instinct 
for food. They have somewhat more sophisticated “needs”, and 
ways to fulfil them (be the ways and needs “nice” or “not-so-nice”). 
Human beings are in human social relationships – friendly or 
inimical, with more power or less power, with stronger ethical codes 
or with weaker ones, subject to traditions and acquired habits or 
struggling against them. They can be worse than wild dogs, for they 
have the space of arbitrariness and the manipulative techniques to 
feed our dislikes.  
Competition is often only a mask. Competition itself makes no 
decisions. Human beings decide who is to “win” and who is to 
“loose”. The empty ethic of competitiveness (especially in 
intransparent managerocratic hands) easily becomes a mechanism 
to blame the apparent loser for losing. (This “social” competition 
differs widely from the controlled competitions that we find on sports 
fields – also see Venter [2002c:425 ff.].) The Social Darwinist 
principle that the loser deserves to loose is more often than not the 
self-justification of those who consider themselves the winners; the 
Machiavellian princely government, which eliminates strong co-
leadership finally promotes mediocracy. 
In these terms, one is not excellent when he/she is not up front 
(wherever “up front” may be, and however he/she makes it up 
there). There are no defined goal posts, so the struggle goes on to 
the grave. In a historical reality with competitiveness as the empty 
norm, all we have is the struggle. Competition itself is our being and 
the being of our world: it is a Sein zum Tode. To “be” means “to be 
up front”, or “to fall behind”, or “to catch up”. One’s identity, one’s 
self, in fact one’s being in the world, is to be somewhere in the 
competitive hierarchy. Nothing is fixed, and our only fixed and 
unshared possession is our death. The record of my excellence, the 
curriculum vitae, is completed only in death, my only sole 
possession. Nobody can share in my death; only my death is my 
own, says Heidegger.  
Standstill is death – is the naturalist adage of Hobbes. Hobbes’ 
philosophy is surely our democratic way of livingly dying: not to grow 
economically is not simply to be stable, or even to stagnate, it 
actually implies to die! To become “mature” in the old sense of 
“wise”, “stable”, and happy with the link you could establish between 
your “being”, your “having” and your “doing”, is not possible in a 
purely competitive society. Culture shock – being alienated from the 
cultural environment to which one claims to belong – is becoming 
our way of life.  
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5. University, science, technique, freedom 
As already emphasised – the very structural ideals of the university 
academe are threatened. The university has a long tradition of 
freedom (that it often neglected, but a freedom to which the 
university could always return). The university has, for some time 
now, been operating in a dialectical tension with the authoritarian 
forces of scientism, technicism, and economism on the one hand, 
and the demands of the state, that constantly intervene with different 
excuses, on the other. At times these forces were stronger, but there 
was always room for resistance. It, however, remains a question 
whether, in the context of global economism, we can still count on 
this tension to keep important matters upright in the academe.  
Proposition 7:  
 To the detriment of all intellectual work, including science and 
technology, the culture of learning is dying out (inter alia) 
because the university has lost its sense of calling.  
The university tradition is one of training. Essential to the university 
is the presence of students. The training of students in scientific 
scholarship (with or without a professional focus) is to be regarded 
as the core task of universities: introducing students to the “well-
established” and the “innovative” moments in the (mainly Western) 
intellectual tradition. This approach presupposes the active 
presence of certain structural elements in the university’s focus, and 
therefore also the duty of the university to promote the good 
functioning of these elements.  
Scholarship in the sense of “being learned” is one of the age old 
basic elements of the university academe. The most famous 20th 
century authors of textbooks in Classical languages, coming from 
the Oxford-Cambridge tradition, very often only had a Masters 
degree.12 They knew their discipline, and they knew the cultural 
context, visible in the examples and exercises in even a Greek 
grammar, for they were literate over a wide spectrum. “Being 
learned” – being a scholar – is the way to situate your discipline in 
the wider context of a cultural tradition, and to remain up-to-date 
with the intellectual world at large, as well as with your own 
discipline, for the sake of responsible scholarly training and 
                                      
12 Even today in my discipline, Philosophy, the Oxford B.Phil. has more status 
than an Oxford doctorate. 
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education. A historical perspective helps to understand foundations 
and the outcomes of our own work. 
Yet concomitantly with the phenomenon of our entertainment 
society, the visual media has become dominating, and the culture of 
reading is diminishing fast. In public presentations one still hears 
quotes from Plato, Kant, or Shakespeare, but rather as “quotable 
quotes”, decorating the presentation with apparent learning, and so 
discontextualised as to mean something quite different from what 
the borders of context would allow. Without wide literacy there is no 
“being learned”, no “scholarship” in the deepest sense. We have 
become used to images that roll and jump; to fragments of worlds. 
There is no more staying with, or repeated revisiting, of the beloved 
text. Post-modernism in the arts is an exhaustion of the new, and a 
revisiting of the old in a contemporary electronic cloak – 
Shakespeare can only return with pistols and large American cars. 
Even the old must be new – transformed into fleeting electronic 
images. History is only today’s story. This is what the death of the 
reading culture says. Yesterday is today’s trash can.  
The liberal arts tradition as a basis for specialisation is seriously 
threatened by one-sided technicist professionalism in the 
“programme” approach of setting syllabi. Even in the United States 
where this format has its origins, the indications are that the 
traditional liberal arts model, as well as specifically majors in 
philosophy and mathematics, provides more competent students in 
professional programmes than the professional disciplines 
themselves are able to (cf. Blackburn, 1988:1442).  
Note: those who brought about significant changes in the “natural” 
sciences very often had no formal scientific training, and used 
metaphors and even methods gained from areas of culture and the 
academe other than the discipline in which they excelled. High 
output research universities tend to suppress the possibilities to read 
widely and be a learned – and thus a potentially creative – academic 
rather than an ultra-specialist technical scientist. This situation, 
however, is to the detriment of technical work itself, for its limitations 
are no more seen. (NB: I am not denigrating technical science – just 
point to the suppression of its better possibilities.) 
Not only is learning neglected in favour of a strictly “natural 
scientific” approach (scientism), combined with standardised 
techniques (technicism). The academe’s critical function itself is 
suppressed! The troubles experienced by a South African natural 
scientist recently (as reported in the newspapers), when he exposed 
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the pollution caused by the corporation he worked for, is not limited 
to the money-driven “private sector”. Similar interest-driven 
sanctions have already penetrated deeply into the functioning of the 
university, inter alia through licensing and patent agreements, and of 
course also conditional sponsorships, bursaries and donations. The 
possible transgressions of legal or moral codes by interest groups in 
cases like these are probably the lesser danger.  
Proposition 8:  
 Of much greater danger is the belief in the saving grace of 
science and technology by academics themselves.  
“Pre-Modern” technique was very specifically geared to the needs of 
the individual user, made to fit like clothes. A bow was made to 
extend the hunting powers of a specific hunter: adjusted to the 
length of his arms and body, to his bodily strength, etcetera. One 
man’s bow could not easily be transferred to another.  
Modern technology has, however, its foundations in scientific 
abstractions and tend to take the format of general modules. This 
means that a contemporary technique can be applied in areas other 
than those originally intended for – usually overshooting or 
undershooting the needs of the situation. This “under-” or “over-
empowerment” with regard to its aims often makes contemporary 
technology dangerous, both in the area of its intended use, and 
even more in those areas where its modular generality allows not-
intended use.  
The steadfast faith in such standardised techniques give academic 
consultants the self-confidence to seriously influence the personal 
lives of people, whether it be managerial techniques offered, or 
therapeutic procedures, or exploitation of resources. The consultant 
is more often than not the practical adherent of scientism today. And 
since the techniques offered are products of the entrepreneurial 
university, they are regarded as above criticism, for the “butchery” of 
the academic supermarket cannot be allowed to publicly criticise the 
products sold by the “groceries” section.  
The critical function of a university is part of its quality. Therefore in 
judging a student, more and other issues should count than only 
technical skill. Lynn Margulis is a bit radical, but expresses the issue 
well in her policy of selecting post-graduate students. “I never take a 
straight-A student. A real scientist tends to be critical, and 
somewhere along the line, they had to rebel against their teachers” 
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(Margulis, 2003:2). An integrated multi-faculty approach will serve 
the reconstruction of the university’s critical function, at least as far 
as students go. 
Practical issues regarding standardised techniques 
• A student of languages will surely ask questions about the 
hermeneutic aspects of behaviorist, decontextualised psycho-
metric tests. At the university where I teach, the study of 
languages is the task of the Faculty of Arts and Philosophy; 
Psychology is accommodated in the Faculty of Health Sciences; 
Industrial Psychology in the Faculty of Economic Sciences, and 
Educational Psychology in the Faculty of Education. Training 
programmes have been written in such a way that it is very 
difficult to accommodate intensive cross-fertilisation, for example 
to structure a debate about meaning between psychologists and 
linguists in spe.  
• Another example: A student studying Social Anthropology may 
ask critical questions about the way in which a natural scientist 
goes about tackling the AIDS problem “simply” in a technical way, 
without enough sensitivity to the socio-economic and cultural 
contexts of the disease. Again, programmes have been written in 
such a way that this critical cross-fertilisation is almost 
impossible, and academics in the natural sciences will actively 
discourage and even block moves by intelligent students to do 
something about it. Or they will get one of their own to produce a 
fragment of Social Anthropology to fulfil their technical need.  
Professionalist, technicist minds will object that programmes are in 
any case trans-disciplinary. The problem is that only technical skills 
are included in a trans-disciplinary way, usually uncritically in the 
form of very condensed course units of which the foundations are 
ignored. In fact, the skills and techniques are decontextualised from 
their root science and learnt by heart in other contexts. 
Undergraduate students simply learn the statistical formulas needed 
for psychometrics by heart, without really understanding their 
foundations, meaning, and limitations within the discipline of 
statistics. I am not arguing that they need to be able to deduce the 
formulas; rather that they should understand their contextual fits and 
misfits. Students in management and communications learn 
fragments of psychology as techniques to handle people, without 
really understanding the theoretical basis. Thus they may deny 
human dignity without even knowing it, simply because they do not 
understand the view of the human being behind the test. 
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6. The market: technicism in paradigm science and in 
outcomes-based training 
Proposition 9:  
 The paradigmatic conservatism of scientists noted by Kuhn, is 
rooted in financial and power relationships, and is to the 
detriment of sustaining a responsible intellectual culture at 
university level.  
An economistic market orientation in science will support a strong 
paradigmatic “normal science” problem-solving-for-profit procedure. 
It tends to eliminate schools of thought, and to frown seriously about 
alternative approaches. Thomas Kuhn noted that “normal-science” 
practitioners are very conservative and aim at solving problems for 
which the answers are in fact already known: 
Normal science, the puzzle-solving activity … is a highly 
cumulative enterprise, eminently successful in its aim, the 
steady extension of the scope and precision of scientific 
knowledge. In all these respects it fits with great precision the 
most usual image of scientific work. Yet one standard product 
of the scientific enterprise is missing. Normal science does not 
aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds 
none (Kuhn, 1970:52). 
Kuhn is suggesting that the moment of “failure” in normal science is 
actually the creative one, on condition that the moment of surprise, 
the failure, is noted and followed up. I guess he suggests that the 
strict conditions under which normal science sets expectations 
makes the non-realisation of expectations noticeable. He insists that 
it is characteristic of science to make discoveries. But given the long 
life of some paradigms, I think that noticing an unexpected 
occurrence that appears to be a counter-example, is not the same 
as in fact accepting it as an anomaly. The number of uncontrollable 
components of even a very strictly planned experiment always 
leaves room to believe in the basic propositions of a theoretical 
construct, even if expectations do not realise. One can always say 
that some instrument does not measure precisely enough, or that 
factors still to be found are influencing the results, or that there is a 
minute error in the representation of certain processes. (The 
responses to Lavoisier’s paradigm shift in chemistry may be a case 
in point.) 
I, however, think Kuhn overlooked a possibly more serious human 
cause of the conservatism: a critical, paradigm-challenging 
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approach threatens high output and income, since it creates 
suspicion about the techniques. What will happen with licensed tests 
or questionnaires if the foundations on which they are built are 
questioned? Where will our patents (entrepreneurial universities 
excel in these) end up if we start showing that they are not 
constructed on sound thinking?  
If we do not, however, stimulate precisely such critical attitudes in 
our students, are we then really doing our duty to prepare the youth 
to live for more than money, or take the environment into account, or 
to care about those in need? When not trained to ask questions 
beyond problems of technical expertise, we may be preparing them 
for obedience to authoritarian and totalitarian control measures and 
policies (whether by politicians or managers), repeating the mistakes 
of Condorcet and the French revolutionaries (discussed above; cf. 
also Von Hayek, 1952; Venter, 1996:230 ff.). Furthermore, I am not 
sure what effect the practical example of withdrawing (marketable) 
knowledge from public scrutiny may have on students who want 
their presumably critical teachers to practise the responsible critique 
preached by university tradition! 
The philosophy behind outcomes-based training,13 introduced a few 
years ago in South Africa, and expanded over all areas of education 
and training, is in line with all the trends of our time. Primarily the 
aim of OBE is to raise the “quality”, “relevance” and “cost-
effectiveness” of education and training for the sake of 
“competitiveness”. Terms like “quality”, “relevance” and “effective-
ness” are all given economic interpretations, through the aim of 
“competitiveness”. Cultural education is suppressed. OBE pretends 
novelty far beyond its merits, by contrasting itself with traditional 
methods of institutionalised training.  
Proposition 10:  
 Outcomes Based Education accepts practices of “the world of 
work” as its aims and methods, and its values are those of 
economism (whether socialist or capitalist). Tensions between 
education and technical training will therefore be resolved by 
giving priority to the technical.  
                                      
13 I prefer the term outcomes-based “training” to outcomes-based “education”, 
precisely because OBE is all about “skill” and “technique”, as will be shown 
later. 
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Using Kuhn’s idea of a paradigm shift, one adherent of OBE argues 
that “none of the traditional principles and terminologies can directly 
be translated, rephrased, or reworded into the outcomes-based 
learning context” (Olivier, 2001:2). An overstatement on two counts:  
• Kuhn exaggerates “revolutionary” shifts because of his own 
pragmatist philosophy of knowledge and his catastrophist view of 
history. “Paradigm” and “incongruity of meaning” are used in the 
same breath, almost as a logical implication! It is overlooked that 
Kuhn’s own prejudices are constructed into his analysis of the 
philosophy and history of science. Once we feel justified in using 
the term paradigm, we also feel justified in saying that there is 
only discontinuity; no historical meaning overlap at all. Therefore 
translation from one paradigm to another is impossible. We are 
so sure of the total novelty of our ideas, that we are unable to see 
the continuities clearly visible to others (Einstein himself – often 
the paradigm example of paradigm change!) who were not so 
charmed into a revolutionary philosophy of history.14 
• OBE, it is said, is a “unique concept”, “based on its own rules”, 
which are “totally different from traditional learning”. The idea 
therefore is that the “teacher” becomes a facilitator of the 
learner’s self-regulated learning-how-to-learn-when-required. The 
learner aims at what he/she wants to achieve. Yet there is a 
focus, and certain skills to be mastered: 
Outcomes-based learning is based on the same methodology 
that is formally and informally applied in the world of work to 
achieve outcomes. In this way the world of learning and the 
world of work constitute the two sides of the same coin, each 
describing the same phenomenon, just from a different angle. 
Learning the outcomes-based way enables learners to plan for 
intended outcomes … It establishes abilities to prepare before 
executing activities, to communicate with other learners, and to 
assess activities and end-products. … How can workers be 
expected to plan, communicate, etc. within the work context if 
these competencies were not adequately addressed during 
learning? (Olivier, 2001:2). 
                                      
14 Einstein himself apparently did not know about the revolution his work was 
supposed to have introduced. “Es handelt sich keineswegs um ein 
revolutionären Akt, sondern um eine natürliche Fortentwicklung einer durch 
Jahrhunderte verfolgbaren linie” (Einstein, 1955:132). 
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Note the terms plan, communicate, and assess. These terms are, in 
abstracto, the known components of scientific research method, 
especially with regard to teams – but also of military strategy! Why 
do laboratories, statistical consultants, seminar rooms and libraries 
exist at universities and schools? Why, in the defence force, are 
there operations rooms, radio communications training, shooting 
ranges, tank driving classes, pilot training programmes in 
aeroplanes, map reading exercises, and leopard crawling under 
barbed wire networks with live bullets flying overhead? Given these 
similarities, does the overstatement of the difference then imply that 
there is actually nothing new or special in OBE?  
“The world of work” 
I have found one very significant and helpful expression in the OBE 
line of argumentation: “the world of work”. The competencies to be 
acquired are those required by “the world of work”, at least 
according to the interpretation of this “world” by the designers of 
OBE. Again we have a clearly economistic approach, as is also 
indicated by terms like customer (for student), and end-product. 
Even though possibly metaphoric, they create an atmosphere of 
producing and selling – much the same as the terminology in Kerr 
(1963), The uses of the university (and therefore old-fashioned 
“Americanism”). The market orientation is clear. 
The question, however, remains: is this a real paradigm shift? Is it 
really an approach so new that it is totally incommensurable with 
any existing or previous training methods, and totally untranslatable 
into their terms?  
What further disrupts the pretence of a “unique”, “totally new” 
approach with “totally different rules”, is exactly the admission that 
this is the same methodology that we find in the world of work (and it 
is even said that this is also the way in which we organise our lives 
(Olivier, 2001:3). OBE therefore seems to be a generally applied, 
age old, universal, yet unique, totally new, method of acquiring 
knowledge – indeed a superb contradiction! 
However, mentioning “the world of work” directly demonstrates the 
technicist basis of OBE. Granted, the techniques included in the 
policy of OBE are a bit wider than we should usually expect in this 
kind of approach (e.g. the inclusion of “communication”). But since 
the planning of the educational content is determined backwards 
from the point of outcomes wanted by the learner, one is left in the 
lurch about how far the “backwards” determination is supposed to 
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go. Are we going back only to the most essential techniques 
required by the world of work, or, for example, as far back as the 
explanatory basis?  
Do I, for example teach psychology student statistical techniques 
with their direct explanatory contexts (know why), or exactly without 
it (as pure know how)? Or do I even transcend the direct context, 
and proceed deeper to the philosophical basis, which justifies or 
conditions this statistical analysis? OBE is supposed to induce 
critical thinking, but is this wider than the assessment desired in the 
production line?  
The practice of OBE, in terms of the programmes already approved 
by SAQA, and especially in combination with the absolutising of 
professional training (now often for newly invented “professions”), is 
almost purely technical, whether so intended or not.15 And purely 
technical specialist programmes are exactly not the kind of 
programmes that one needs in an era when more and more people 
do not work in their specialisation(s) for longer than ten years! 
Talking of the “world of work” in the same breath as “cost–
effectiveness,” exposes a serious dilemma of technicist training. 
OBE as explained in this article is well-known under another name: 
in-service training! The concept of OBE is therefore almost as old as 
the oldest apprenticeships are. Ivan Illich devoted two whole books 
to this issue, emphasising the advantages and cost-effectiveness of 
ridding ourselves of entire institutional training systems in favour of 
apprenticeships with the best “master craftsmen” in the field (cf. 
Illich, 1972; 1974). His sense of direct effectiveness in technical 
training is correct to a certain extent: To change traditional 
institutional education into a form of “in-service” training is simply 
impossible in any institutional form of training, because one is 
instructed to take into account the individual learner’s preferred 
outcomes, and his/her self-control of learning, as well as that of the 
rest of the class – as individuals! (If this is ever to become a 
communal learning experience, it will have to be done in very small 
group settings.) 
                                      
15 In the case of the university where I work, it has become an excuse for the 
Faculty of Education to eliminate training in disciplines almost totally from their 
programmes. This means that one does not need a high level of training in 
English literature and grammar, as taught at a university department of English, 
in order to qualify in the Faculty of Education as a teacher of English. All the 
knowledge needed is supposed to be integrated in the professional training.  
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• Engineering laboratories at universities and technical training 
facilities are simply different from a real workshop. 
University engineering laboratories in South Africa are mostly far 
ahead of their counterparts in the private sector, but they are not 
production facilities as such. But for those who enter the brain drain, 
our university facilities prove to be far behind those in the richer 
countries. In some poorer countries (as in central Europe), 
maintaining laboratories are too expensive for universities, and 
highly qualified natural scientists are furniture salesmen. This 
situation is costly, because these highly skilled people become part 
of the brain drain by emigrating overseas. Another possibility for 
these highly skilled people is to move into management positions, 
where it takes them a long time to develop the necessary human 
skills, and often also a minimal feeling for the imaginative side of 
being a designer.16 And of course the issue of economic strategy 
still prevails: where does the employment of the engineer comes 
from? In a more Keynesian (activist) approach and from the side of 
the state, engineers may be consultants for state capital projects, 
but if we have a monetarist or neo-classical view, or the state has an 
inability to spend its budget, we shall have an increase of the brain 
drain, or the unemployment of technologists (see for example Van 
Rooyen, 2003).  
In spite of these obvious problems (especially the limited bridgeable 
distance between the worlds of “study” and “work”), even post-
graduate students in the human sciences are now trained (and 
prefer to be trained) as pure, specialist technicians. The high output 
of good technical research creates the impression of overall 
“excellence” (again the competitive, empty excellence), but the 
training does not encourage meditative, reflexive maturation.17  
The training of students is focused on producing results (very often 
measured data) in the shortest possible time. The question “What 
am I doing and what is the meaning of what I am doing?” is swept 
under the carpet. The need to read wider than the specific discipline 
or even the project is smothered, and the perspective of where my 
                                      
16 Significantly some influential “managerocratic” guru books have been written by 
ex-engineers, who do not seem to clearly distinguish machine processes from 
human organisational life. Presently the emphasis in these disciplines falls on 
innovation, which is not the same as creativity.  
17 A university is essentially a philosophical institution in the widest sense of the 
word, says J. Chr. Coetzee (1954:9). 
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work may fit into the world is left to philosophers and theologians, 
working somewhere in the margins.18  
• Small group training – the nearest to individualised training an 
institution can offer – has already become almost impossible. 
We are in a phase of speedy output, mass education combined with 
“right sizing”, “down sizing“, and “rationalisation” – or whatever 
learned term one uses to cover the diminishing of staff and 
infrastructure. Post-graduate degrees are coming at a very fast rate 
(and in some cases standards are visibly falling) in the context of 
research-training structures, such as focus areas, of which the 
nearest analogue is the industrial assembly belt.19 “Interactive” 
(“talking to oneself”) study guides can give the student some 
support, and computer-based training can ease the burden, but 
neither study guides nor computers can inspire the student, nor 
introduce her/him to the quality tradition of the area of study. Quality 
is really not measurable outside a consensus about minimum 
standards. It is rather a tradition established over a long time.20 The 
human teacher is irreplaceable. And although Horkheimer 
characterised the lecture as a failed secularisation of the sermon 
(since it is not dialogical),21 even a good lecture can set a model 
and inspire a student. 
                                      
18 The plea of Horkheimer has been losing its voice: “Uberall über die eigen Fach 
hinauszublicken, sich nicht als Arzt oder Jurist oder Historiker in seinem 
wissenschaftliche Interesse zu verhärten und stumpff zu machen gegen das 
Leiden des Menschen, am Ganzen teilnehmen, der Grenzen des Expertentums 
bewusst zu sein, und doch unermüdlich in seinem Fach besser werden, dass ist 
die Aufgabe” (Horkheimer, 1953:7). 
19 The term, “industrial assembly belt”, is seriously meant – and not witty, 
sarcastic or ironic.  
20 A double edition of Time (2001, August p. 20, p. 27, under the title “The quest 
for quality: why Europe’s craftsmen are still the best”; see Anon., 2001) has 
been devoted to the arts and crafts tradition of Europe. The journalists 
concluded that these arts and crafts have survived centuries of technological 
mass production, because of their quality tradition. Still, the scientistic 
technological tradition of testing and quantifying “quality” had the arrogance to 
test Dutch clogs to determine whether they fulfil the requirements of European 
health and safety standards! 
21 Die akademische Vorlesung … ist eine misglückte Säkularisierung der Predigt. 
In der Form des akademischen Vortrag liegt beschlossen die Autorität der 
Lehre … (Horkheimer, 1953:24). 
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• Establishing a link between the “world of work” and the “world of study” 
is a difficult task, especially when one engages in specialist technical 
training.  
One may attempt to base the link on “marketability”, but the market 
is fickle and highly unpredictable (and not nearly analogous to 
predictable physical processes, as economists want us to believe). 
Although the natural sciences and technology are supported by 
government for the sake of competitiveness, it is often difficult for 
university graduates in this area to find work.22 The more 
“programmed” and “focused” our training is, the less options the 
trained person actually has. One cannot but suggest that a 
somewhat wider training may complement specialist training in such 
a way that either the graduate is prepared to find employment in a 
spectrum of related areas, or is able to re-school in a short period. 
• We must develop OBE techniques for the situation where it works 
best: in-service training  
It will be wise to adopt some of the techniques for institutional 
training, for example closer contact with the work situation. This can, 
however, only be done if the private and the public sector are 
geared to accommodate students for internships, and training 
institutes are prepared to set their calendar not according to the 
needs of rugby and hockey, but according to academic needs 
(specifically the relationship between the world of study and the 
world of work).  
Practical example: 
It should, however, be remembered that even purely specialist, 
technical in-service training is not safe against the instability of the 
market. Where technology is well developed, such as calculative 
technology and the automatic transfer of homogeneous goods, it 
replaces highly skilled but very specialised human beings. An 
example of this is the banking and financial sectors. Cashiers in 
banks and bookkeepers are replaced by machines. Transaction 
speed increases, and profits or savings grow. Service quality, 
however, declines, since one cannot explain a problem to a 
                                      
22 Only ten percent of my university’s natural science graduates of 2000 could find 
work immediately. The market for engineers in South Africa is saturated (and 
has been for quite some time; cf. Van Rooyen, 2003), and the government does 
not spend enough on capital projects. We have an oversupply of technically 
trained university graduates, and an undersupply of good technicians.  
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machine. In fact the use of facilities under direct human control is 
discouraged by price differentials. The only option for young people 
who train at work, is to ask to be shifted to another department as 
soon as they have mastered the skills of any one section, in order to 
gain experience in all sectors. But universities cannot provide for 
such rotation in their training structures. However, the recent 
corporate scandals indicate that even if they could, we should still 
have to train business graduates and technical experts in ethical 
principles, as well as a hermeneutics of suspicion, rather than 
aiming at perfect technical skills. It is, however, our best tradition to 
broaden the scope of training by making it human-sensitive, 
“artistic”, and “philosophical”.  
An utilitarian production ethic  
In the case of OBE, the value system is determined by its focus on 
“the world of work”. This focus implies that the values are set by the 
aims of production. These latter aims again are determined by 
international competitiveness – a utilitarian production ethic. 
“Relevance” usually has a wide meaning – more or less “that which 
has a distinguishable connection with something important”. When 
one, however, talks of “relevance” in the context of OBE, its 
meaning is squeezed into the utilitarian funnel of “the skills 
demanded by the work situation” or, “… by the labour market”, or 
simply: “ … by the market itself”. Thus the shift in market values 
away from needs to consumerism (Adam Smith’s “comforts”) and 
entertainment (Smith’s “amusements”), will co-determine the aim-
side values of OBE: we shall finally end up in the popular hedonist 
form of utilitarianism, for the pace makers in the market determine 
the issues that are addressed in market terms, as well as the price 
structure, and the type of products focused on. The “law” of “supply-
and-demand” is a complex norm, not a “natural law”, and works 
through human agency and power relationships.  
Bureaucratic controls 
The OBE interpretation of utility is clearly strongly focused on the 
technically necessary. SAQA is already quite authoritarian in 
enforcing a very high technical skills content into new programmes, 
to such an extent that one can almost not find slots for even a 
minimum of fundamental critical disciplines. Like SAQA, so are the 
professional associations. They monopolise the registration of 
practitioners, and enforce tight technical programmes. And the 
government’s one-sided support for technical knowledge throttles 
the human sciences and the basic sciences even more. All this is 
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subject to strict bureaucratic controls (local, national, international) 
not only through prescriptions about programmes and methods of 
assessment, but also in terms of the universal audits.23 These 
audits tend to quantify “quality” and/or “excellence” in terms of 
means available for aims, and aims in terms of output desired, as 
well as in terms of the comparative position with regard to aims 
realised and output produced. Is this situation perhaps an illustration 
of Hobbes returned? 
No criteria are provided by which to decide whether the aims are 
meaningful, since post-modern pragmatists recognise no norms that 
specify the character of an institution. The means-aims proportion 
has finality; there are no further criteria to determine whether the 
means are justifiable. Together with the adherence to the 
competitiveness code, such an approach can easily lead to the 
justification of the means by the ends themselves.24 And it is not 
surprising that an authoritarian approach develops, for how can 
excellence be determined comparatively without enforcing a large 
measure of conformity to bureaucratic aims (i.e. workplace demands 
as understood by the civil managerial elite)? Otherwise “donkeys” 
will be compared with “jumbo jets”.  
That section of academic freedom and institutional autonomy where 
critically creative innovations takes place, has to a large extent been 
                                      
23 The audit has its roots in the contermporary belief that achievement can be 
adequately measured in quantitative terms, and therefore, in a market-driven 
context, this measurement has to be done in terms of cost versus output 
translated into money terms. Bureaucrats have extended the term “audit” to 
include various aspects in the equation, but the process remains in the tradition 
of quantifying, and comparative determination of competitive position (cf. Davis, 
1999; Readings, 1996:24 ff.). 
24 The international audit of the Potchefstroom University conducted by the 
Committee of Rectors of European Universities would have delivered no 
insights if it were not that PU staff used the opportunity for anonymous criticism. 
The Committee could not give any circumscription of “academic quality” or 
“excellence”, except in terms of vague and very incoherent references to 
“clients” and “market” and “peers”. They did criticise “in-breeding” on the 
grounds that too large a percentage of the academic staff received their 
doctorates from the North-West ♪University itself. Their view represents a 
quantified criterion of inbreeding, which does not take into account any content: 
the majority of strong internal critics also obtained their doctorates locally, while 
a large number of those who came from “elsewhere” – key appointments by 
management to make sure that the philosophy of techno-scientific economism 
and managerialism is implemented, are quite uncritical. The auditors 
themselves then belong to the in-bred: they have been carefully selected to 
support the pragmatist philosophy imposed by management.  
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eliminated or neutralised by OBE principles, programme structures, 
and utilitarian market demands. Valuable academic time is 
consumed by filling in applications, evaluation forms, output reports, 
feedbacks, budgets, or formulating impossible aims and outcomes 
to satisfy politicians and management. In practice: to satisfy the 
enormous bureaucratic machinery (that has to develop information 
systems, assessment techniques, evaluate and approve).25  
7. A few concluding remarks 
• The university was originally founded on the concept of 
“rationality” 
The university was erstwhile founded on the concept of rationality, 
as the characteristic of a sensible human being, and even that which 
the human being shared with God. Rationality, with its array of 
meanings centred in evaluative thinking according to logical rules, 
has, however, been reduced in contemporary times to technical 
mastery (especially of a calculative nature), and gainful com-
petitiveness. Intellectual communities that take these as their special 
values, tend to train self-centred or group-centred intellectual 
leaders, rather than socially caring ones.  
• The concept of rationality as having advantage and mastery 
The concept of rationality as having advantage and mastery, fused 
with egocentric pleasure maximising rationality (the format that 
competitiveness finally took), was embedded in the humanist belief 
that through this interpretation of being human, we could be masters 
and possessors of “nature”, in the fashion of the master craftsman. It 
came to mean that through science and practical rational action, 
human rationality has the ability to impose the law unto “nature”. The 
belief itself that rationality is the distinctive characteristic of being 
human has, however, been seriously compromised. Thus the values 
                                      
25 Even senior staff with good academic records have to undergo constant 
evaluations by their managers. Would that those managers read Fichte: “Man 
studiert ja nicht um lebenslänglich und stets dem Examen bereit das Erlernte in 
Worten wieder zu geben, sondern um dasselbe auf die Vorkommende Fälle des 
Lebens anzuwenden, und es so in Werken zu verwandlen …; es ist den nach 
auch hier letzten Zweck keineswegs das Wissen, sondern vielmehr die Kunst 
das Wissen zu gebrauchen” (Fichte, 1956:7). Whereas at the Potchefstroom 
campus of the North-West University the “support” staff number twice the 
academic staff, support staff directly available for academics has dwindled, 
following the advice of a mathematician consultant who determined 
mathematically how many academics ought to do with one secretary.  
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by which our young people live are determined by enjoyment and 
entertainment, based on the appropriation by their parents. Respect 
for the “object” of mastery, “nature” (which according to some people 
includes the human being), is diminishing fast. (In fact one could see 
the New Age forms of pantheism as a reaction against this 
exploitative Modernity; which, together with the fear of Communism 
and Islam, pushes the Christian rightwing even further in a direction 
to the advantage capitalism and militarism).  
• The importance of the intellect 
The intellect, including its rational function, always had primary 
importance in Western culture. It is a great irony of history that the 
logic of Modern autonomous reason emancipating from “nature”, 
implied Jacobinism and Napoleon’s techno-scientific dictatorship. 
Enlightenment became “authoritarianism”. Implicit in the techno-
scientific epistemology is the belief of techno-scientists that they are 
themselves the elite who have to emancipate others, whether using 
liberal (competitive), or collectivist (Jacobinist or Communist), or 
dictatorial means. Although each of the three are vying for primacy, 
the real issue, underlying all three, is the power of techno-scientism 
as applied in the context of economism and a hedonistic lifestyle.  
• The marketable knowledge epistemology 
The marketable knowledge epistemology discourages critical 
evaluation and publicly absolutises products of science, as means of 
control over the lives of human beings. This point of departure is 
applied over a broad spectrum: from the making of weaponry, 
through biotechnology to psychometric testing. It even applies to the 
ideology of competitiveness, which has itself become a technique for 
control and enforcement of the managerial will.  
• Competitiveness does not guarantee quality 
One of the myths at the basis of the belief in competitiveness is that 
it guarantees “quality” or “excellence”. Competition itself does not 
universally guarantee quality. (Sometimes it may even be the other 
way round: within market niches quality may guarantee com-
petitiveness.) Competition – that is, the type of competition we 
supposedly find in the market – is rather about elimination of the 
opposition. (This approach is not analogous to competition in 
amateur sports.) It is not “competition” that decides who wins. There 
are human beings behind the masks of competition who do make 
decisions about winning or losing.  
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“Benchmarking” and “excellence” are in themselves no criteria for a 
university. Social Darwinism is in itself impractical: even Hobbes 
saw the warlike “state of nature” as a dangerous hypothetical 
alternative, which he used to defend the absolute authority of the 
British king. Competitive quality determination in academic work is 
not determined according to output, which changes the quality issue 
into a quantity issue, for this is the only way in which management 
can hold onto control in terms of the doctrine. (Note the glut in 
academic journals, irrelevant information, and now an overload of 
researchers with doctoral degrees, who cannot find work; cf. Brahic, 
2004.)  
• The university governed by capitalist technicism has lost its 
sense of calling  
The culture of university learning is dying out to the detriment of 
science and technology, since it robs technique of its socio-cultural 
and moral content. The university governed by capitalist technicism 
has lost its sense of calling: to train students the skills of critical, 
evaluative analysis; an ability that does not assume that a technique 
is good and safe just because it has been patented, licensed, and 
internationally accepted. Moreover, there are clear indications that a 
liberal-arts basis for the professional programmes improves the 
quality of the professionals.  
• Technicism and managerialism erode “human dignity” 
The belief in the saving grace of science and technology neglects 
their abstract modular character. This is to the detriment of “nature” 
and humankind. Technicism and managerialism are eroding “human 
dignity”, and since the university has become the victim of both, the 
wrong example is being set to students.  
An important example is Outcomes Based Education, since this is 
the basis of present-day education. But it has completely fallen into 
the trap of technicism. It therefore over-accentuates its own 
newness: the importance of practical application dates (at least) 
from the Renaissance. It in fact seems not so much more than what 
has for decades been called “in-service training”, except that now 
we want it done at educational and training institutions. The problem 
is that the ability of such institutions to simulate the actual work 
situations is very limited (even in institutions of a highly technicised 
nature).  
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• Creativity is suppressed to conserve the paradigm 
Creativity, which goes much further than innovation, will be 
suppressed for the sake of conserving the paradigm. Finally the 
technicising of science and scholarship ends up in the dialectics of 
paradigmatic conservatism and innovationism. Creativity, which 
goes much further than innovation, will be suppressed for the sake 
of conserving the paradigm, but behind the screens the 
conservatism is determined by materialistic gainful advantage.  
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